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Abstract
I submit that over the last two or three years, we may observe troubling signs that Article 82 of
the EC Treaty is being used more as an adjunct to industrial policy than as a pure competition law
tool. This is especially evident in refusal to deal cases. The intervention of antitrust in a situation
of refusal to deal is a critical pointer of how an antitrust enforcer perceives itself and of what kind
of competition law is in force. At a time when ten new agencies have joined the family, it is es-
pecially desirable to approach controversies in a sober manner. It would be unfortunate if EC law
as applied in Brussels appeared to be presenting a misleading example. It is difficult to deny the
existence of a clear divergence in this area between the more liberal or minimalist approach which
prevails in the United States and has recently been celebrated by the Supreme Court in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, and the more formalistic or maximalist ap-
proach of the Commission. The Commission attributes comparatively lower weight to a dominant
player’s freedom to run its own business, and comparatively more weight to the protection of com-
petitors than U.S. courts. It may also reflect a longstanding transatlantic difference as to the risk
of the negative consequences for the economy of unsound intervention. The Trinko judgment was
the counterpart of Bronner, standing for the principle that only in the rarest circumstances should
a dominant player be obliged to do business against its will. I will center my analysis and criticism
of the Commision’s controversial new thinking by referring to these two very revent cases, in both
of which I am involved.
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I. ARTICLE 82 NEVER SLEEPS
Article 82 of the EC Treaty1 has always offered European
lawyers a certain frisson of excitement. When it was first en-
forced by the Commission in the early 1970s, it seemed to be the
awakening of a hitherto sleeping beast, part monster, part
keeper of the peace. Until then, Article 82 of the EC Treaty2
had been considered an exceptional curiosity on paper rather
than a real constraint upon the business conduct of monopolists.
While in the last forty years our - and indeed the Commission's
- understanding of Article 82 and of its enforcement is more
mature, the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position still re-
mains the major source of suspense in EC competition law en-
forcement. My first visit to the European Court was to attend (as
a young spectator) the argument in Commercial Solvents & Others
v. Commission.3 I can still remember the sense of moral disap-
proval of the bullying tactics of the accused company.4 That
moral element in the application of Article 82 has not disap-
peared; its presence is distinctively European. It can lend confu-
sion to the analysis when the question is whether and how far a
* Queen's Counsel at the Scots Bar, Visiting Professor, University of Glasgow;
White & Case, Brussels. Warm thanks are expressed to my colleague Assimakis Komni-
nos of the Athens Bar for his contribution to this paper. The opinions expressed are
wholly personal. Reference is made herein to court proceedings which occurred on
September 30 and October 1, 2004, and to an Advocate-General's opinion dated Octo-
ber 28, so this article is a contribution to a continuing debate, certainly not the last
word.
1. See Treaty establishing the European Community, O.J. C 325/33 (2002) [herein-
after EC Treaty].
2. Article 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, as it
then was.
3. Joined Cases 6-7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223 [hereinafter Commercial Solvents].
4. I recall the Commission's assertion that its conclusion on the cutting-off of sup-
plies was based imprecisely on a few phone calls to possible alternative sources, but I
was convinced that the plaintiff, Zoja, had indeed been wronged.
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dominant company is obliged to assist its competitors. While the
European Commission confidently rejects any suggestion that it
concerns itself more with the protection of competitors than
with the maintenance of the competitive process, I believe that
there is basis for criticism.5 The Commission of course replies
that keeping alive one weaker competitor in the face of abuse
will enhance the viability of the competitive process weakened by
the large player's huge market power.
I submit that over the last two or three years, we may ob-
serve troubling signs that Article 82 of the EC Treaty is being
used more as an adjunct to industrial policy than as a pure com-
petition law tool. This is especially evident in refusal to deal cases.
The intervention of antitrust in a situation of refusal to deal is a
critical pointer of how an antitrust enforcer perceives itself and
of what kind of competition law is in force. At a time when ten
new agencies have joined the family, it is especially desirable to
approach controversies in a sober manner. It would be unfortu-
nate if EC law as applied in Brussels appeared to be presenting a
misleading example. It is difficult to deny the existence of a
clear divergence in this area between the more liberal or mini-
malist6 approach which prevails in the United States and has re-
cently been celebrated by the Supreme Court in Verizon Commu-
nications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko,7 and the more for-
malistic or maximalist approach of the Commission. The
Commission attributes comparatively lower weight to a domi-
nant player's freedom to run its own business, and comparatively
more weight to the protection of competitors than U.S. courts.
It may also reflect a longstanding transatlantic difference as to
the risk of the negative consequences for the economy of un-
sound intervention.
Since there are rather few Article 82 cases, and since I have
5. See RicH-RD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 175 (2003); see also William J. Kolasky,
What Is Competition? A Comparison of US and European Perspectives, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 29
(2004).
6. William Kolasky has recently referred approvingly to the approach of the U.S.
authorities in antitrust enforcement, as opposed to the European Commission's policy.
See Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr LLP, The Article 82 EC Abuse Concept: What
Scope is therefor Modernization?, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION L. UPDATE, Nov. 24, 2004, at 5
(reviewing the presentations of panelists at "The Article 82 EC Abuse Concept" Confer-
ence in Brussels, September 30, 2004).
7. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). For further analysis, see the Verizon v. Trinko roundtable
discussion in 7(2) GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. 16 (2004).
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been personally involved in two recent controversies, I wish to be
cautious about identifying the imminent apocalypse too readily.'
In February 2004, I considered that the Trinkojudgment was the
American counterpart of Bronner,9 standing for the principle
that only in the rarest circumstances should a dominant player
be obliged to do business against its will. It is generally undesir-
able for a company to be compelled to share its resources. How-
ever, only two months later, in the Microsoft Decision, the Com-
mission ordered a company to draw up a detailed description of
its own technology in order to deliver to competitors the means
of replicating that technology in their own products.10 And four
months later, the Commission contended to the European
Court of Justice that a pharmaceutical company was duty-bound
to supply exporting wholesalers with whatever quantities of a pat-
ented medicine they desired, since to limit deliveries to them
would constitute a restriction of their economic freedom.1 '
Both initiatives should encourage us to reflect.
Very detailed, long-lasting and far-reaching remedies no-
tionally right past alleged abusive behavior by dominant firms,
but in reality dictate specific business policies. Such policies, a
8. I have been involved as an advocate in Commission Decision 89/205/EEC, O.J.
L 78/43 (1989) [hereinafter Magill], upheld by the Court of First Instance ("CFI") in
Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, Case T-69/89,[1991] E.C.R. 11-485 [hereinafter RTE
1], upheld on appeal by the Court of Justice of the European Communities ("ECJ") in
Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. Commission, Joined
Cases 241 & 242/91, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743 [hereinafter RTE I1]; in Commission Decision
2002/165/EC, OJ. L 59/18 (2002) [hereinafter ADC], withdrawn by Commission Deci-
sion 2003/741/EC, OJ. L 268/69 (2003) [hereinafter NDC/IMS]; IMS Health GmbH &
Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-418/01 (not yet reported) [hereinafter
IMS]; and, in 2004, in Microsoft, Commission Decision of 24 March 2004, Case COMP/
C-3/37.792 [hereinafter Microsoft Decision], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition; Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04 (pending). There is a wise
tradition which counsels prudence to those who have been engaged as advocates; in
this article I shall try to respect that tradition. At the same time, the events are very
recent and there is a high interest in them, so I have elected to offer more robust
sentiments than I normally would in an academic piece. Others have offered copious
alternative theories, so the prudent reader will study several opinions before drawing a
conclusion.
9. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag
GmbH & Co. KG & Others, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791, 76 [hereinafter Bron-
ner].
10. Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, art. 5(a)-(e), at 299-300 (2004).
11. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias &
Akarnanias and Others v. Glaxosmithkline AEVE, Case C-53/03, 8, 11, (2003)
(pending) [hereinafter Syfait Opinion].
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sort of regulatory micro-managing hardly suitable for an anti-
trust authority, almost never make business sense. I respectfully
submit that the remedy appears to arise from looking forward at
the desired conduct rather than looking backward and ensuring
the discontinuation of the abuse. The link between the com-
pelled conduct and the infringing act may, indeed, be rather im-
perceptible, although the compelled conduct may have great po-
litical or industrial symbolism. To put matters rather severely,
but not necessarily unfairly, the analysis sometimes seems to start
with the desired remedy rather than with the theory of the
abuse. Hence the title of this article.
I am undecided about how serious is the consequent degree
of uncertainty for business in Europe. While I accept the pro-
position that legal uncertainty is, indeed, inherent in antitrust,1 2
and have myself mocked the claims to need legal certainty in the
context of notifications, stability in enforcement patterns helps
business to grow and prosper. We need to provide for an en-
forcement framework that rewards business acumen and innova-
tion at the expense of timidity and inefficiency. We do not want
to create an ethos of passivity among market players, who may be
tempted to rely on the "benevolent" intervention of the govern-
ment. Such an atmosphere of paternalism, redolent of centrally
planned regimes in the 1960s, is the worst service public authori-
ties can offer to the market.
European competition law was unique in the world in rec-
ognizing the distortive consequences of State intervention in the
marketplace. The Commission has taken huge steps to prune
State distortion of normal market forces. Encouraging risk-tak-
ing and initiative by the private sector must be the prime goals
not just of our industrial policy, but also of our competition pol-
icy. The Commission seems to be very eager to support research
and development; it also aims at making private investment in
research and development more attractive.13 But its declarations
12. See Barry E. Hawk & Nathalie Denaeijer, The Development of Articles 81 and 82 EC
Treaty: Legal Certainty, in EuR. COMPETITION L. ANNUAL 2000: THE MODERNISATION OF
EC ANTITRUST POLICY 137, 140, 230 (Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds.,
2001).
13. See Communication from the Commission: Investing in Research: An Action
Plan for Europe, COM (2003) 226 Final/2, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/
en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0226en02.pdf. The objective set by the March 2002 Bar-
celona European Council is to increase the average research investment level from
1.9% of GDP (current levels) to 3% of GDP by 2010, of which 2/3 should be founded
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on supporting research and development ("R&D") need to be
balanced by recognizing that over-eager expansion of antitrust
liability theories may reduce incentives to innovate. 4
The European Commission has recently advocated or im-
posed extraordinary remedies, one as to pharmaceuticals and
one as to software. If it were not that the addressee of the latter
is Microsoft, we would be astounded by an order addressed to
companies to create a new product of lesser quality and place it
on the market even if there may be no consumer demand, or to
supply competitors with secret technical information in order to
enable a better "degree" of competition from those competitors.
Behind such remedies lie some highly creative theories. I will
centre my analysis and criticism of the Commission's controver-
sial new thinking by referring to these two very recent cases, in
both of which I am involved.
II. PHARMACEUTICALS AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE: HOW
FAR CAN A DUTY TO DEAL GO?
In my view, in EC competition law, we can observe three
strands to the obligation-to-deal cases: essential facilities cases
involving ports and bridges;15 elimination of competition cases
involving the cancellation of deliveries which would allegedly
by the private sector). The action plan calls, inter alia, for "improving the environment
of research and technological innovation in Europe: intellectual property protection,
regulation of product markets and related standards, competition rules, financial markets,
the fiscal environment, and the treatment of research in companies' management and
reporting practices." Id. at 4, 10 (emphasis added). The Commission boasts that "the
recent overhaul of EU anti-trust law gives more emphasis to economic assessment" and
stresses that innovation considerations should take a prominent part in antitrust analy-
sis. Id. at 23.
14. See Commission Staff Working Paper: Investing in Research: an Action Plan for
Europe, SEC (2003) 489, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/era/3pct/
pdf/com2003-annex.pdf. It mentions competition policy as one of the major policies
influencing the environment for innovation. Id. at 17-18. The Federal Trade Commis-
sion reached the same conclusion in its Report To Promote Innovation: the Proper Balance of
Competition and Patent Policy, Ch. 1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/20O3/10/innova-
tionrpt.pdf.
15. See, e.g., Commission Decision 94/19/EC, 0.J. L 15/8 (1994) [hereinafter
Stena]; Commission Decision 94/119/EC, 0.J. L 55/52 (1994) [hereinafter Rodby];
Commission Decision 98/190/EC, 0.J. L 72/30, (1998) [hereinafter FAG]. Telecom-
munications wires and cables may also be capable of being essential facilities. See Com-
mission Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the
telecommunications sector - framework, relevant market, and principles, O.J. C 265/2
(1998), at 49-53, 87-98 [hereinafter Competition Rules]. I personally do not accept that
intellectual resources can credibly be described as constituting an essential facility.
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render the victim bankrupt (Commercial Solvents, 6 Ladbroke,7
Bronner,8 and now Syfait), 9 and compulsory licensing cases like
Volvo!Veng,2 ° Magill,2 1 IMS,22 and Microsoft.21
III. PHARMACEUTICALS
A. The Facts
The first case that I will examine deals with the question of
whether competition authorities and courts may use Article 82 of
the EC Treaty with the goal of encouraging the growth of ex-
ports of patented products from Member States where prices are
set at low levels to Member States where prices are set at higher
levels. The European Commission may not have been the en-
forcer in this case, which was a reference from the Hellenic
Competition Committee, but it submitted forceful observations
during the preliminary reference procedure before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.
Pharmaceuticals, whose prices are effectively set by the na-
tional public authorities (which are both their largest buyer and
their price-setter), have perpetually presented controversies
where traditional Commission doctrines about the merits of par-
allel trade contradicted economic gravity. The price discrepan-
cies between the Member States are often large. Sales of
pharmaceuticals to export-oriented wholesalers in low-price
countries fuel patterns of trade to high-price countries, patterns
which are regarded as artificial by the pharmaceutical manufac-
turer. Though they are a source of astonishingly rich profits for
parallel traders, these sales confer zero or minimal benefits on
Europe's patients and health care systems. (This is a dense ver-
sion of a much more complex statement, as in each Member
State the power to set prices and make reimbursement to pa-
16. Commercial Solvents, Joined Cases 6-7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223.
17. Tierch Ladbroke SAv. Commission, Case T-504/93, [1997] E.C.R. 11-923 [here-
inafter Ladbroke].
18. Bronner, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791.
19. Syfait Opinion, Case C-53/03 (2003) (pending).
20. AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211 [herei-
nfater Volvo/Veng].
21. Magill, O.J. L 78/43 (1989), upheld by the CFI in RTE I, [1991] E.C.R. 11-485,
upheld on appeal by the ECJ in RTE II, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743.
22. IMS, Case C-418/01 (not yet reported).
23. Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, on appeal Microsoft Corp. v. Com-
mission, Case T-201/04 (pending).
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tients is structured differently, and the precise figures vary from
time to time.) The pharmaceutical companies deal with the
problems caused by parallel trade using a variety of supply poli-
cies based on historical supplies, or by giving priority to custom-
ers selling on the national market. Under these systems, phar-
maceutical companies typically supply quantities that are more
than sufficient to satisfy the demand of patients in each national
market, while the wholesalers remain free to export all their
purchases, or to serve their national market first and export only
the remaining surplus quantities.
In the late 1990s, deliveries to wholesalers in Greece of cer-
tain pharmaceutical products were several times higher than the
national Greek demand for those products. For every tablet
swallowed by Greek patients, six tablets were delivered to the
Greek marketplace. Five went to Germany, the UK, or the
Netherlands, and one was consumed in Greece. The export ac-
tivities of the Greek wholesalers led to shortages of products in
the Greek market, as well as reducing the earnings of manufac-
turers, affiliated companies in other Member States, who bore
the duties and the costs of public-service responsibilities for the
product, but sold only small volumes to their local wholesalers.24
In 2000, Glaxosmithkline ("GSK") unilaterally decided to adjust
the product quantities supplied to the Greek market, so to meet
the prescription needs of the national market plus a surplus
each month. Complaints were made by disappointed wholesal-
ers, who opposed any limit to their capacity to purchase the few
"fashionable" products. 25 The Greek Competition Committee is-
sued an interim decision, in which it found that GSK had abused
its dominant position, and ordered GSK to supply unlimited quan-
tities of three of its products to all wholesalers and cooperatives.
There then ensued twelve months of proceedings before the
Competition Committee, during which there was copious exami-
nation of the facts and extensive debate (in Greek and in En-
glish) concerning the relevant law. The Greek authority decided
to postpone a final decision, and referred a number of prelimi-
nary questions to the European Court of Justice.2 6
The theory of dominance advanced by GSK's critics was that
24. Id. 29.
25. Id. 6.
26. See Syfait Opinion, Case 53/03 (2003) (pending).
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each pharmaceutical product protected by a patent was a unique
product (albeit one with therapeutic competitors). One conse-
quence of this market definition is that unsuccessful patented
products are equally as dominant as successful patented prod-
ucts. Thus, there were a number of arguments as to whether
and how a pharmaceutical company could enjoy a dominant po-
sition, given the distinctive characteristics of the pharmaceutical
marketplace. Most of the debate in Luxembourg related to
whether there was an abuse. The main substantive question was
whether the refusal of a dominant company to satisfy fully the
orders of wholesalers constitutes per se abuse within the meaning
of Article 82 EC, if this refusal is due to the undertaking's inten-
tion to plan the distribution of its products efficiently, while lim-
iting the export activity of the wholesalers, and thereby the harm
caused to it by parallel trade.
B. The Extraordinary Remedy and the Law
The Syfait case was heard in May 2004. In its observations
before the Court of Justice, the Commission pleaded in favor of
the finding of an abuse of dominant position and, thus, by impli-
cation, in favor of the unprecedented remedy to satisfy all or-
ders.27 Delivering limited quantities was, according to the Com-
mission, equivalent to a prohibition of exports, and led to a par-
titioning of the markets concerned.28 But this was not all. GSK
was also accused of interfering with the commercial freedom of
the wholesalers. Supplying their orders would, according to the
Commission, guarantee a second source of supply that creates
intra-brand competition in high-priced countries.2 9
Before examining the Syfait case as an antitrust case, we
must acknowledge the political and institutional context. As I
have noted elsewhere,30 the cult of parallel trade as a factor en-
hancing market integration is akin to a civil religion, for the re-
spect of whose integrity the European Commission is the princi-
pal prophet. The principle is that market integration is good for
Europe, good for consumers, good for competition. Reproaches
27. See id. 48-50.
28. See id. 50.
29. Id.
30. See Ian Forrester, The EFTA Court Confronts Re-labelling: Paranova AS v. Merck &
Co., Inc. and Others, Judgment of the EFFA Court of 8July 2003, CaseE-3/02, 7-8 EUR. L. REP.
278 (2003).
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against parallel traders as free riders have been rejected in a
string of cases over twenty-five years. The pharmaceutical indus-
try asserts that market integration will not be enhanced by paral-
lel trade since governments, who are the chief payers for pre-
scription medicines, do not need parallel trade to bring down
prices. They can simply order price reductions on their own ini-
tiative by virtue of the power of their public authority. The Com-
mission admits that governmental involvement in price-setting is
pervasive, but asserts the companies have freedom of maneuver
in that they can decide to launch or not to launch a product,
and further denies that the industry is impotent in price negotia-
tions.3 '
Let us start from the interim remedy imposed by the Greek
competition authority, and - most curiously - apparently en-
dorsed by the Commission. The remedy is extraordinary: GSK,
a pharmaceutical company, is under an affirmative duty to sup-
ply unlimited orders from wholesalers active in the trade of cer-
tain prescription drugs from low-price to high-priced Member
States. 2 Can this be sound antitrust enforcement policy?
Should antitrust authorities ought not be involved in the deter-
mination of how much a company should supply to wholesalers,
in order to believe that its conduct is not abusive or anti-compet-
itive?33
It was alleged that limiting deliveries in Greece would re-
strict or preclude intra-brand competition in the United King-
dom. For doctors and patients in the United Kingdom, however,
the two products (sold directly to UK wholesalers by the manu-
facturer or sold in Greece then imported via a UK wholesaler)
are identical in characteristics, price, and appearance. It was
said that as a result of the constraint upon supply, high purchase
prices were maintained, to the detriment of consumers in the
United Kingdom. Yet UK consumers pay a flat rate prescription
fee, regardless of whether they are prescribed a locally-delivered
or a parallel-traded product.
The European Courts have on several occasions indicated
that there is no abuse in refusing supplies to a customer who
31. Syfait Opinion, Case C-53/03 (2003) (pending), 93-94.
32. Id. 8.
33. Speaking at a conference, a senior Commission official had, indeed, gone as
far as indicating what margin (30%) above national prescription needs would make
quota systems acceptable to the Commission.
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does not depend on those supplies for survival.34 The Syfait case
was not a classic refusal to supply case, because GSK was not re-
fusing to supply wholesalers, and, indeed, was supplying them
with quantities more than sufficient to cover the needs of the
Greek market. But the classic refusal to supply cases of the Euro-
pean Courts are important, because they suggest that in order to
be abusive, the conduct of the dominant firm must jeopardize
the customer's continued existence." The European Commis-
sion has a legitimate concern to protect downstream undertak-
ings from being put out of the market through abusive behavior
by a dominant upstream firm, and has justified its interventions
as being necessary to keep the customer alive. In my submission,
once the downstream firm ceases to be dependent on the domi-
nant upstream firm, Article 82 EC becomes inapplicable.36 The
Greek wholesalers said they were dependent on the company for
delivery of specific patented drugs, of which it was the sole
source; but they were not dependent for their survival, as they
could find other pharmaceutical products in which to deal.
There was no evidence that any Greek wholesaler or parallel
trader went out of business. On the contrary, the wholesalers
continued to make high profits.
According to the critics of the industry, a pharmaceutical
company had a choice between two contrasting options: (1) the
company should not market its products in low price countries
in order to avoid parallel trade (bad luck for Greek patients
whose doctors want a new medicine with which to treat their pa-
tients); or (2) once it has chosen to sell in a low-price country, its
affiliates in low price countries must supply unlimited quantities,
since otherwise they are hindering the economic freedom of
those who wish to deal with them.
34. In Tierce Ladbroke SA v. Commission, the CFI indicated that there is no abuse in
refusing supplies to a customer, who does not depend on those supplies for his survival:
".... unless it concerned a product or service which was either essential for the exercise
of the activity in question, in that there was no real or potential substitute, or was a new
product whose introduction might be prevented, despite specific, constant and regular
potential demand on the part of consumers .... " Case T-504/93, [1997] E.C.R. 11-923,
131.
35. See Benzine Petroleum Handelmaatschappij BV v. Commission, Case 77/77,
[1978] E.C.R. 1513, 20.
36. The Commission in BBI/Boosey &Hawkes wanted to ensure that the "applicants
are not put out of business." Commission Decision of 29 July 1987, BBI Boosey &
Hawkes, O.J. L 286/36 (1987), 19 [hereinafter BBI].
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Such dogma conflicts with conventional notions whereby a
dominant undertaking is permitted to defend its commercial in-
terests, provided that the measures it takes are proportionate to
the threat which the conduct of the trading partner poses to the
interests of the dominant undertaking.37 The Court has consid-
ered that even a refusal to supply, exercised by a dominant un-
dertaking, may be reasonable unless it exceeds what might be
objectively contemplated in the case at issue."8 It is indeed curi-
ous to contemplate that a supplier is accused of refusing to sup-
ply, when it furnishes significantly more than national demand
but declines to deliver limitless volumes.
The analysis of many competition questions in Europe is dis-
torted by the unique significance attached to market integration
under our competition law. Pursuing the civil religion by honor-
ing cross-border trade more than other economic activity is a
well-established phenomenon. The question is whether that
doctrine should override conventional notions of abuse of a
dominant position. Can restrictions on parallel trade, as such,
be always considered a per se abuse of dominant position?39 In
Bayer, the CFI clarified that
provided [a manufacturer acts] without abusing a dominant po-
sition, and there is no concurrence of wills between him and
his wholesalers, [he] may adopt the supply policy which he
considers necessary, even if, by the very nature of its aim, for
example, to hinder parallel imports, the implementation of that pol-
icy may entail restrictions on competition and affect trade between
Member States.40
The Court of Justice has on another occasion confirmed the
"non-sacred" status of parallel trade for EC competition law. In
Commission v. Belgium, it has stated that
37. United Brands v. Commission, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, 189; Irish
Sugar v. Commission, Case T-228/97, [1999] E.C.R. 11-2969, 112 [hereinafter United
Brands]. This principle was repeated, inter alia, in the BBI/Boosey & Hawkes decision,
where the Commission stated that "a dominant undertaking may always take reasonable
steps to protect its commercial interests, but such measures must be fair and propor-
tional to the threat." BBI, O.J. L 286/36 (1987), 19.
38. United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. 207, 191.
39. Of course, there is no consensus that the concept of per se abuse exists. See, e.g.,
Richard Whish, Should There Be per se Abuses Under Article 82 EC?, Kommentar, 51(10)
WIRTSCHAFT UND WEarBEWERB (2001).
40. Bayer AG v. Commission, Case T-41/96, [2000] E.C.R. 11-3383, 176 (empha-
sis added).
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differences in the price of the same product, from one Mem-
ber State to another, may be accounted for by the commer-
cial strategy of the manufacturing undertaking, and a hin-
drance to imports may not be inferred from the mere fact
that an undertaking abandons the marketing of a given prod-
uct on the market of a Member State on the ground that the
maximum price imposed on it is inadequate. It may be ob-
served, for example, that, in order to avoid parallel exports, an under-
taking may have an interest in not marketing its products in a Mem-
ber State at a price which it considers to be insufficiently remunera-
tive.41
One may legitimately infer that if an undertaking can choose not
to market, it can choose how much to market.
The wholesalers, supported by the Commission, argued that
commercial freedom in Greece was being hindered in that they
were not getting desired quantities. Now, any company could
argue that commercial freedom is restricted if it does not get all
it desires out of a relationship. Yet no sensible business partner
would enter into an open-ended and unlimited obligation to
supply to patients outside Greece products at the low Greek
price. Every pharmaceutical company must also plan its distribu-
tion policy in terms of public service legal obligations to ensure
delivery to patients. 42 No manufacturer from Greece could sub-
contract its legal obligations in Germany, by saying that parallel
importers would take delivery. Simultaneously, the company
would not fulfill its legal obligation under Greek law if it did not
address export-driven shortages on the Greek market."3
The Syfait case shows that certain elderly dogmas of Euro-
pean competition policy have remarkable vigor even though
they have exceeded their useful life. The opinon of Advocate
General Jacobs, rendered on October 28, 2004, is likely to be
regarded as a landmark judicial contribution to the debate
about the nature of the pharmaceutical industry and the regula-
tory context within which it operates, and even more so about
whether it is an abuse of a dominant position to supply a trader
with less product than desired. In short, the Advocate General
argues that a pharmaceutical undertaking holding a dominant
41. Commission v. Belgium, Case C-249/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1-1275, 20.
42. These public service obligations are imposed by sectoral regulation, in order to
guarantee that patients get served on a steady basis through pharmacies.
43. Syfait Opinion, Case C-53/03 (2003) (pending), 81.
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position does not necessarily abuse that position by refusing to
meet in full the orders sent to it by pharmaceutical wholesalers
merely because it aims to limit parallel trade.44 Moreover, the
refusal to meet such orders is objectively justifiable, and thus
does not constitute an abuse, where the price differential driving
the parallel trade is the result of State intervention in the low-
price export jurisdiction fixing the price there lower than that
which prevails in the higher-price importing Member State.45 A
restriction of supply by a dominant pharmaceutical undertaking
in order to limit parallel trade is thus capable of justification as a
reasonable and proportionate measure in defense of that under-
taking's commercial interests.4 6
The Advocate General concludes that when pharmaceutical
undertakings attempt to block parallel trade, they are not
thereby seeking to entrench price differentials of their own mak-
ing, but rather to avoid the consequences which would follow if
the very low prices imposed upon them in some Member States
were generalized across the Community.4 7
It remains to be seen whether the Court's judgment will fol-
low the Advocate General's approach, and what the Commission
will do thereafter. As to this controversy, the tide may have
turned.
IV. MICROSOFT
A. IP v. Antitrust in EC Competition Law
The second case raises similarly important questions as to
the extent to which a competition authority may impose an obli-
gation to deal upon a dominant and highly successful company.
The similarity with Syfait lies in the extraordinary nature of the
remedies contemplated. However, what distinguishes Microsoft is
that the remedy imposed represents the most expansive inroad
of EC competition law enforcement into the protection of intel-
lectual property rights in Community legal history.
The interrelationship between intellectual property rights
and competition law has always been an interesting theme for
antitrust enforcers, practitioners and academics. The standard
44. Id. 69.
45. Id. 100.
46. Id.
47. Id. 78, 100.
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theory is that the two are not in conflict, but that they converge
in the pursuit of the same objective, the creation of a competi-
tive market led by technological innovation for the benefit of
consumers.4" Naturally, it is those few exceptional situations of
conflict which have attracted most attention.
That there is convergence between intellectual property
rights and competition law, is widely recognized by most compe-
tition law specialists, as well as by the European Commission it-
self, which stresses the following in its recent Guidelines on the
application of Article 81 EC to technology transfer agreements:
[B]oth bodies of law share the same basic objective of pro-
moting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of re-
sources. Innovation constitutes an essential and dynamic
component of an open and competitive market economy. In-
tellectual property rights promote dynamic competition by
encouraging undertakings to invest in developing new or im-
proved products and processes. So does competition by put-
ting pressure on undertakings to innovate. Therefore, both
intellectual property rights and competition are necessary to
promote innovation and ensure a competitive exploitation
thereof.
49
In the specific context of the abuse of a dominant position, the
analysis remains the same. The purpose of intellectual property
protection is to provide firms, whether dominant or not, with
incentives to innovate, including the ability to use their innova-
tions to their own competitive advantage and prevent competi-
tors from misappropriating the benefits of their investments in
research and development. The invocation by a dominant com-
pany of intellectual property rights, cannot, in principle, lead to
an abuse, otherwise there would have been two kinds of intellec-
tual property: for dominant and non-dominant enterprises.
Nonetheless, the European Courts have ruled that a domi-
nant undertaking can be obliged in "exceptional circumstances"
to license its intellectual property to third parties. Any time an
innovator has to share with competitors the fruits of its innova-
48. See, e.g., Lucas Peeperkorn, IP Licences and Competition Rules: Striking the Right
Balance, 26 WoRLD COMPETITION 527, 528 (2003).
49. Commission Notice Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC
Treaty to technology transfer agreements, O.J. C 101/2 (2004), 7 [hereinafter Article
81 Guidelines].
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tions, competitors will have "enriched" themselves to the detri-
ment of the innovator's own creative efforts.
It is very easy for the discussion to move rapidly from sobri-
ety to zealotry. The opposing arguments are easy to state, even
to caricature by slogans. The rightholder will rely on his private
property and incentives to innovate; the skill, money and time
invested in creative effort; and claim that any encroachment en-
dangers all other persons similarly situated. Such enrichment
and detriment respectively would not be remedied by royalties.5 °
On the other hand, the "infringer" might rely on the foreclosure
of competition due to the right, the lack of R&D involved, the
improbable nature of the right, the unreasonable or capricious
behavior of the dominant player, and the very moderate nature
of the contemplated compulsion. There have been very few
cases from which to derive conclusions about the general law.
The intervention of Article 82 EC has been sanctioned by the
Courts in particularly exceptional circumstances of exclusionary
conduct. The challenge for the antitrust enforcer is to identify
those exceptional circumstances and use its best judgment in or-
der to intervene with utmost prudence. Decisions can be very
difficult because of the extent of the encroachment and the diffi-
culty of setting limiting principles.
Volvo/Veng was the first case in which the European Court
considered with proper care whether a simple refusal to license
could be abusive. Via an IP right, the rightholder controlled
what we would now call an after-market, for the making of re-
placement parts for its own products. Volvo held a registered
design over the front wing panels of Volvo 200 cars, which in
effect gave it a monopoly in the UK over a utilitarian three-di-
mensional shape which presented no patentable features. Veng
imported these products, manufactured without authority from
50. In IMS, the Commission had argued that IMS's temporal deprivation of its IP
right was compensated by reasonable royalties. See IMS Health Inc. v. Commission, Case
T-184/01 RI, [20011 E.C.R. 11-3193, 142. This argument, however, did not impress
the Court, which stressed in the following paragraph:
[i]t is important initially to recall that the public interest in respect for property
rights in general and for intellectual property rights in particular is expressly reflected
in Articles 30 EC and 295 EC. The mere fact that the applicant has invoked
and sought to enforce its copyright in the 1 860 brick structure for economic
reasons does not lessen its entitlement to rely upon the exclusive right granted
by national law for the very purpose of rewarding innovation.
Id. 143 (emphasis added).
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Volvo, and marketed them in the United Kingdom. Volvo insti-
tuted proceedings against Veng for infringement of its UK regis-
tered design rights, and the case was referred to the European
Court of Justice. There are two famous paragraphs, maybe
drafted by different judges, more probably by the same judge,
which state the basic principles. The Court exercised caution in
order not to deprive the rightholder of the substance of the reg-
istered design right too casually,51 while also not preventing
companies from relying on competition law to attack a refusal to
license an IP right in what we would now call "exceptional cir-
cumstances. '5 2  In the end, the Court found that the circum-
stances justifying liability under Article 82 were not present:
[Tihe refusal by the proprietor of a registered design in respect
of body panels to grant to third parties, even in return for rea-
sonable royalties, a licence for the supply of parts incorporat-
ing the design cannot in itself be regarded as an abuse of a domi-
nant position within the meaning of Article 86 [now 82] .5
(emphasis added)
So a refusal to license can cease to be part of the core bundle of
rights, and can become abusive, if special factors are present of
which some examples (presumably illustrative but not exhaus-
tive) were given. While Volvo/Vengwas regarded as a triumph for
the car companies which asserted the legality of their freedom to
license potential competitors to make the product, it was never-
theless somewhat Delphic. The Court was able to please every-
51. Volvo/Veng, Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, 8 ("It must also be emphasized
that the right of the proprietor of a protected design to prevent third parties from
manufacturing and selling or importing, without its consent, products incorporating
the design constitutes the very subject-matter of his exclusive right. It follows that an
obligation imposed upon the proprietor of a protected design to grant to third parties,
even in return for a reasonable royalty, a licence for the supply of products incorporat-
ing the design would lead to the proprietor thereof being deprived of the substance of
his exclusive right, and that a refusal to grant such a licence cannot in itself constitute
an abuse of a dominant position.").
52. Id. 9 ("It must however be noted that the exercise of an exclusive right by the
proprietor of a registered design in respect of car body panels may be prohibited by
Article 86 [now 82] if it involves, on the part of an undertaking holding a dominant
position, certain abusive conduct such as the arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to
independent repairers, the fixing of prices for spare parts at an unfair level or a deci-
sion no longer to produce spare parts for a particular model even though many cars of
that model are still in circulation, provided that such conduct is liable to affect trade
between Member States.").
53. Id. 11.
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one by a judgment which said "on the one hand, and on the
other hand. .. ."
In Magill, however, the Commission had to make a decision.
The broadcasters in the United Kingdom and Ireland issued lists
of their future program times to every newspaper publisher in
the United Kingdom and Ireland, with permission (indeed en-
couragement) to publish these times free of charge on a daily
basis (the lists could be published two days at a time on week-
ends). Reproduction of the times on a weekly basis was forbid-
den in order to avoid competition with each broadcaster's own
respective weekly guide, the only source of information on a
weekly basis about upcoming programs. To be fully informed,
the Irish television addict would need three separate magazines
each week. The broadcasters collectively enjoined Magill from
publishing a multi-channel guide showing all three broadcasters'
programs side-by-side. During the interlocutory proceedings in
Ireland and before a judgment by the Irish courts on the merits,
the Commission decided to act on Magill's complaint of abuse of
dominant position, and ordered the broadcasters to begin nego-
tiations with Magill for a royalty-bearing license. The Commis-
sion's Decision was appealed to the Court of First Instance.
Ultimately, the Court of First Instance produced an ex-
tremely robust judgment, finding in favor of the Commission:
Conduct of that type - characterized by preventing the pro-
duction and marketing of a new product, for which there is
potential consumer demand, on the ancillary market of tele-
vision magazines and thereby excluding all competition from
that market solely in order to secure the applicant's monop-
oly - clearly goes beyond what is necessary to fulfill the essen-
tial function of the copyright as permitted in Community law
... The applicant's conduct cannot, therefore, be covered in
Community law by the protection conferred by its copyright
in the programme listings.54
The refusal to license an IP right could, in the very particular
circumstances of the case, constitute an abuse. Nevertheless, the
judgment, like the Decision, was heavily criticized, and there
were a number of interventions on appeal to the ECJ by those
54. RTE I, [1989] E.C.R. 11-483, 73. "Essential function" is a term developed in
free movement of goods cases as a means of defining those instances where Articles 28
and 30 required that the national right had to give way to Community goals.
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voicing concerns of principle. The Court of Justice also agreed
with the Commission and the CFI that "exceptional circum-
stances" were present.
55
The facts of Magill led commentators in Europe to the view
that this was a case that was explained by those facts, and that
this was just one exceptional "encroachment" of EC competition
law upon intellectual property rights.
The 2001 Commission Decision in IMS (at interim mea-
sures) was the first time since the landmark initiative in Magill
twelve years previously that the same doctrine was applied. As in
Magill, the Commission's intervention was requested to moder-
ate the otherwise fatal consequences of a dominant player's suc-
cessfully invoking at an interlocutory stage an improbable na-
tional IP right. IMS is the world leader in gathering and supply-
ing data on deliveries to pharmacies by wholesalers of
pharmaceuticals. Pharmaceutical companies use this data to
measure the effectiveness of their promotional efforts in each
town and district. On the German market a geographic format
for presenting this data had been developed by IMS and its cus-
tomers (the pharmaceutical companies) and had become the de
facto industry standard. This structure divides the map of Ger-
many into 1,860 zones or "bricks" corresponding to postcode
boundaries, by reference to which marketing data describing de-
liveries, prices and volumes in those zones is compiled and ana-
lyzed. When significant competitors appeared on the German
market, IMS relied on copyright to prevent them operating.
The customers said that presenting the marketing data in any
other geographic format was not acceptable as they paid their
employees and observed numbers of prescription sales by refer-
ence to the 1,860 zones. The competitors challenged before the
German courts the use of copyright to prevent them competing,
and also complained to the Commission. NDC was the most
prominent complainant.
The Commission found that there was no possibility for
companies wishing to offer pharmaceutical sales data in Ger-
many to employ any convention for ascribing sales data geo-
graphically other than the convention used by IMS. In order to
supply usable marketing data to customers, that data had to de-
scribe sales in geographic zones as their customers delineated
55. RTE II, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743, 51-56.
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them. There were no substitutes or alternatives to reporting
sales along the same geographic lines as the map of postcodes as
arranged by IMS, which, IMS was successfully claiming, consti-
tuted a breach of its copyright. The Commission found that
IMS's bringing of copyright infringement actions was an abuse
of its dominant position. The Commission considered that the
litigation was likely to eliminate all competition, and that the re-
fusal to grant a license lacked "objective justification." The Com-
mission did not base its attack on the possibility that IMS had
hijacked an industry standard.
The Commission's decision in IMS was, as in Magill, widely
criticized on intellectual property grounds, since it was thought
contrary to "well-established legal principles" and because it
risked to "discourage investment in intellectual property".56
Again, as in Magill, IMS was suspended by the President of the
Court of First Instance. 57  National litigation in Germany
culminated in a preliminary reference ruling of the Court ofJus-
tice on April 29, 2004, which constitutes the most authoritative
pronouncement of the European judicature to this date on com-
pulsory licensing of intellectual property rights.58
The ruling of the Court of Justice, drawing from Magill and
Bronner, stated or recapitulated the four conditions under which
a dominant undertaking may be ordered to license its intellec-
tual property rights:
(a) the product or service to which access is sought must be
indispensable for carrying on a particular business;
(b) the refusal is such as to exclude any competition on a
secondary market;
(c) it prevents the emergence of a new product for which
there is a potential consumer demand; and
(d) the refusal is not justified by objective considerations.5 9
These conditions are cumulative6 ° and are likely to be inter-
56. See, e.g., John Temple Lang, European Community Competition Policy - How Far
Does It Benefit Consumers?, 18 BOLETIN LATINOAMERICANO DE COMPETENCIA 129 (2004),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/international/others.
57. See IMS Health Inc. v. Commission, Case T-184/01 RI, [2001] E.C.R. 11-3193.
58. See IMS, Case C-418/01 (not yet reported).
59. Id. 37-38.
60. Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, KPN Telecom BV v.
Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit (OPTA), Case C-109/03 (2004)
(judgment currently pending), 35.
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preted restrictively and applied with extreme caution. As Advo-
cate General Poiares Maduro has recently acknowledged:
a duty under Article 82 EC for a dominant undertaking to aid
its competitors should not be assumed too lightly and refusal
to supply a competitor is not automatically considered abu-
sive just because the inputs in question are necessary to com-
pete on a secondary market. A balance should be kept be-
tween the interest in preserving or creating free competition
in a particular market and the interest in not deterring invest-
ment and innovation by demanding that the fruits of com-
mercial success be shared with competitors. 61
I note here a point of detail. Comparing the Advocate Gen-
eral's Opinion and the Court's judgment in IMS, I see a certain
"divergence" in the legal reasoning. Whereas Advocate General
Tizzano started his analysis from Commercial Solvents and
Tildmarketing62 (true refusal-to-deal cases) before going on to the
IP cases Volvo/Veng and Magill, as well as to Bronne,63 the Court
chose to start its analysis directly from Volvo/Veng and Magill,
which made up, in the Court's view, the relevant case law.6 4 This
"divergence" of analysis in such a celebrated case must mean
that the Court intended to stress the "exceptional circum-
stances" aspect of compulsory IPR licensing cases, which stand
over and above the general refusal-to-deal cases.
The distinction between intellectual property rights and
other property rights for the purposes of the imposition of a
duty to deal under EC competition law is not just formalism.
Such a distinction is necessary. The difficulty is the identifica-
tion of limiting principles. It cannot be the law that, every time
an IP right confers a monopoly, there arises a duty to license. IP
rights are intended to confer an exceptional privilege upon indi-
viduals. So judging the legality of not licensing them by refer-
ence to the "pro-monopoly" consequences of the right's invoca-
tion will never yield good results.65 Indeed, the exceptionalness
61. Id. 39.
62. T6lmarkefing v. CLT and IPB, Case 311/84, [1985] E.C.R 3261.
63. See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, IMS, Case C-418/01 (not yet re-
ported), 99 48, 49.
64. IMS, Case C-418/01 (not yet reported), 9 34-39.
65. See John Temple Lang, The Application of the Essential Facility Doctrine to
Intellectual Property Rights under European Competition Law, Speech Made at the
Antitrust, Patent and Copyright Conference Organized by Ecole des Mines de Paris,
Cerna and University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Jan. 15-16, 2004), at 4,
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of IP rights has two facets. One is an innovation facet. Intellec-
tual property rights are one of the locomotives of innovation,
rightholders use them to their own competitive advantage and,
in the long-term, the consumers' constant need for new techno-
logically-advanced products is better served by the incentive to
innovate given to the right holder.6 6 The second is an EU law
facet. Article 295 of the EC Treaty protects private property, as
recognized by the national legal systems of the EU, and this in-
cludes intellectual property.67 Article 295 does not confer im-
munity upon holders of IP rights: it may be said to confirm the
proposition that Community policies must be pursued while giv-
ing proper respect to private property interests.
B. The Microsoft Decision
Microsoft is a huge company with large resources. It has
attracted a substantial degree of criticism and it has had a long
history of antitrust litigation in the United States. The European
case, or rather the bringing of the US case before the European
fora, began in December 1998 with a complaint by Sun Microsys-
tems, a US manufacturer of hardware which also supplies server
operating systems that run on its hardware. Sun alleged that
Microsoft had not supplied it with Microsoft technology, needed
to enable its server operating systems to achieve integrated inter-
operation with Windows client operating systems. Sun's com-
plaint was not limited to software interfaces exposed by Windows
client operating systems, but extended to "integrated technolo-
gies" in Windows server operating systems, which Sun asked that
Microsoft disclose and make available for use. Sun asserted that
Microsoft's proprietary interfaces and integrated technologies
were an "essential facility.168
The Commission's Decision in Microsoft was issued at the
conclusion of a five-year investigation of Microsoft, during which
available at http://www.cerna.ensmp.fr/cerna-regulation/Documents/ColloqueAnti-
trust2004/TempleLang.pdf.
66. Id.
67. Aside from Article 295 of the EC Treaty, Article 30 of the EC Treaty refers to
"the protection of industrial and commercial property." E.C. Treaty, supra note 1, arts.
30, 295, O.J. C 325/1 (2002).
68. Sun and Microsoft finally settled their differences and entered into a wide-
ranging technical cooperation agreement in 2004, involving mutual assistance in the
development of products.
940 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:919
the Commission issued three Statements of Objections (as well
as a further clarification of its theories in the form of a letter sent
from DG Competition to Microsoft shortly before the Decision
was issued). The reproaches and remedies evolved considerably
during the proceedings. Brief mention was made in the Second
Statement of Objections in 2001 of the inclusion of additional
features into Windows, in the form of video streaming capacity,
and by the Third Statement of Objections in 2003 that had be-
come one-half of the case against Microsoft, the other half being
the "refusal to supply" of interoperability information. A num-
ber of other theories were raised but discarded.
On March 24, 2004, the Commission adopted its final Deci-
sion finding two abuses of a dominant position by Microsoft Cor-
poration.69 First, Microsoft was accused of having refused from
October 1998 to supply "interoperability information"70 to its
competitors and to allow the use of such technology for the pur-
pose of their developing and marketing operating systems for
server computers performing so-called work-group functions.7 1
Second, Microsoft is accused of having integrated improved me-
dia functionality into its Windows personal computer operating
systems from May 1999 without simultaneously offering, at the
same price if it so chose, a version of Windows without that me-
dia functionality. The violation was not adding the new features,
but the failure to offer at the same time a version lacking those
features, even at the same price as the more advanced version.
For these two infringements, the Commission imposed the
largest fine (_497 million) in competition law history. As a rem-
edy for the first infringement, Microsoft is ordered to draw up
detailed descriptions of the communications protocols 72 by
69. See Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, art. 2(a), at 300.
70. "Interoperability information" is according to Article 1(1) of the Commission
Decision "the complete and accurate specifications for all the Protocols implemented
in Windows Work Group Server Operating Systems and that are used by Windows Work
Group Server to deliver file and print services and group and user administration ser-
vices, including the Windows Domain Controller Services, Active Directory services, and
Group Policy services, to Windows Work Group Networks." Id. art. 1 (1).
71. According to Article 5 of the Commission Decision, Microsoft must "make the
Interoperability Information available to any undertaking having an interest in develop-
ing and distributing work group sever operating system products.. . ." Id. art. 5.
72. A "protocol" means, according to Article 1(2) of the Commission Decision, "a
set of rules of interconnection and interaction between various instances of Windows
Group Server Operating Systems and Windows Client PC Operating Systems running
on different computers in a Windows Work Group Network." Id. art. 1(2).
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which Microsoft's operating systems communicate with one an-
other - referred to as "specifications" - and then to license
competitors to use those specifications for the purpose of devel-
oping their own products. As a remedy for the second infringe-
ment, Microsoft is ordered to develop a version of Windows
from which some media functionality has been removed (186
files in the Windows operating system) and offer it to customers
in Europe on terms which do not discourage their taking it seri-
ously.
I will deal mainly with the first alleged infringement, the
one which leads to compulsory licensing of IP rights. The infor-
mation to be delivered to competitors was said by Microsoft to be
secret, protected by copyright and covered by patents, and the
fruit of years of engineering effort. Vendors of operating sys-
tems compete intensely in developing successful communica-
tions protocols, which support a variety of operating system fea-
tures. In ordering the compulsory licensing of specifications for
Microsoft's proprietary communications protocols the Decision
was, said Microsoft, fundamentally at odds with sound prece-
dents and principles.
The Commission Decision gives an immense mass of facts
(over 280 pages), while dedicating only twenty to thirty pages to
legal theory. Although the Decision makes no written mention
of the theory of "super-dominance," at the oral argument on Oc-
tober 1, 2004, that notion was advanced by the Commission as
relevant. We have to assume, however, that the doctrines set
forth in the Decision of March 24 are applicable to every other
dominant company. One test used by the Decision entails an ad
hoc balancing of the "general public good" against a dominant
undertaking's right to deal with whom it pleases.73 This open-
ended test creates, in my submission, an extraordinary amount
of unpredictability and legal uncertainty."4 How can a large
player know in the future whether it risks condemnation for not
saying yes in the past to a request for assistance? The law needs a
73. Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, 711.
74. Compare the critical remarks of Derek Ridyard in his intervention in the con-
ference on "The Article 82 EC Abuse Concept," in Brussels, Belgium, on September 30,
2004. Ridyard accuses the Commission's Microsoft Decision of "elastic manipulation of
the legal concepts" and considers its balancing test that is based on hazy notions of the
general "public interest" as detrimental to predictability and legal certainty. Id.
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coherent way of separating sheep from goats, the good refusals
to help from the bad refusals to help.
C. The IMS Test and Microsoft
Before dealing with the Microsoft Decision of March 24,
2004 in light of the IMSjudgment of April 29, 2004, I would like
to return to my observation above on the divergence between
Advocate General Tizzano and the Court. The legal argumenta-
tion of the Court of Justice makes clear that compulsory licens-
ing of intellectual property is only a very exceptional remedy in
antitrust, subject to its own restrictive conditions (the IMS test).
The Commission's Decision sought to reduce the exceptionality
of compulsory licensing by using theories based on refusal-to-
supply cases.
The exceptional nature of the compulsory licensing remedy
in the Microsoft Decision is striking. For the first time in Euro-
pean (world?) competition law history, a competition authority
has imposed on a dominant undertaking an obligation of indefi-
nite duration to draw up a description of its technology for the
sole purpose of delivering that description to an unidentified
number of competitors, and then to license its competitors to
exploit the technology so they may improve their own products.
I have never been persuaded that European competition
law would accord an identical level of deference to every na-
tional right. It is not a coincidence that Volvo/Veng, Magill and
IMS, each a difficult case where the outcome was not obvious,
concerned rights at the "thin" end of the spectrum of rights.
The compulsory licenses in Magill and IMS could be seen as very
rare correctives for the consequences of invoking aberrant na-
tional rights in a manner which foreclosed competition.75
Does that mean that some intellectual property rights can
be disregarded by competition law if they lack "merit"? No. A
75. See Ian Forrester, EC Competition Law as a Limitation on The Use of IP Rights in
Europe: Is There a Reason to Panic?, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2003: WHAT
Is AN ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION? (Claus Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu
eds., 2005), available at http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2O03(pa-
pers).sht,ml; see also Ian Forrester, Compulsory Licensing in Europe: A Rare Cure to
Aberrant National Intellectual Property, Presentation at the Department ofJustice/Fed-
eral Trade Commission Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and
Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: Comparative Law Topics, (May 22, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020522forrester.pdf [hereinafter For-
rester, Compulsory Licensing in Europe].
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legal right is a legal right. If a legal system or, afortiori, interna-
tional law instruments protect it, that protection must in princi-
ple be honored, and any encroachment upon it has to be capa-
ble of being analyzed, justified and defended without embarrass-
ment. However, if the Court of Justice pronounced itself so
cautiously in Magill and IMS, where the intellectual right con-
cerned was quirky, not the most obvious textbook example, the
conditions for compulsory IP licensing must be no less restrictive
where the right protects that which society intends to protect
and reward, namely innovation. In other words, the IMS test
represents a necessary minimum for compulsory licensing. It is
arguable that IP rights in more innovation-driven industries
should be subject to even more restrictive and exceptional con-
ditions before compulsory licensing can be contemplated.
Recall the previous cases. In Magill, the information at
stake was the order in which television programs were to be
shown in the forthcoming week. In IMS, the information at
stake was a pattern which divided up the German map into terri-
tories whose frontiers corresponded to German postal code
boundaries. In both cases, the information was widely known in
the industry: in Magill, the TV listings were given free-of-charge
to hundreds of newspapers every week, and in IMS the map had
been drawn up with the participation of industry members and
was used as the industry standard for presenting data. It is not
surprising that the eligibility of such information for copyright
protection under national law was hotly disputed in both cases.
Indeed, in Magill the Commission had - until the Irish High
Court pronounced - doubted that copyright could cover televi-
sion program listings. The first question of the CFIjudges at the
Magill hearing was whether the Commission conceded that copy-
right did indeed subsist in the licensed material. The CFI noted
that, according to the Commission, it was necessary to appraise
the legal and economic "value" and "well-foundedness" of the
copyright in the weekly listings in the present case, having re-
gard to the objectives normally attributed to such a right. In that
light, it asserted that it was necessary to take into consideration
the nature of the property protected from the technological, cul-
tural or innovative point of view, together with the purpose and
justification in domestic law of the copyright in listings. Apply-
ing those criteria, the Commission found the program listings
not to be in themselves "secret, innovative or related to re-
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search."7 6 Advocate General Jacobs in Bronner did not miss this
point and stressed that "the provision of copyright protection for
program listings was difficult to justify in terms of rewarding or
providing an incentive for creative effort."7 7
Likewise, Former Advocate General Tesauro, speaking
about the Commission's interim measures Decision in IMS,
stresses:
This point, in fact, is to do with the very tension existing be-
tween antitrust and property rights, in particular intellectual
property rights. In its decision the Commission does not ex-
plicitly put into question the value of the copyright at stake.
However, one of the factual elements which is thoroughly ex-
plored by the Commission is the origin of the brick structure.
From the evidence collected by the Commission, one has the
feeling that the creation of the industry standard is more to
do with the contribution and the involvement of the pharma-
ceutical companies than with a genuine, independent, crea-
tive effort entirely coming from the right holder. Thus, these
arguments could have been a factor militating in favor of less
stringent protection of such a copyright.78
Thus, there was authoritative doubt about the extent to which
Magill and IMS could betoken a broad-ranging vulnerability of
mainstream rights to the application of Article 82.
Let me now go back to the IMSjudgment. Unfortunately
for the Commission, this most authoritative statement on com-
pulsory licensing emerged five weeks after the Microsoft Decision
on March 24. I submit that the Commission's own test in the
aggregate is in reality new competition doctrine and that it can-
not survive scrutiny under the IMS criteria.
The first condition of the IMS test is indispensability. Is the
material to be delivered to Microsoft's competitors indispensable
for them to compete in the supply of what the Decision refers to
as "work group" server operating systems? Conventional princi-
ples of competition law (Bronner79 and Tierce Ladbroke ° in partic-
76. RTE I, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-485, 45-46.
77. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Bronner v. Mediaprint Case C-7/97,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-2291, 63.
78. See Giuseppe Tesauro, The Essential Facility Doctrine: Latest Developments in EC
Competition Law, in EU COMPETITION LAW AND Poucy, DEVELOPMENTS AND PRIORITIES
100 (Hellenic Competition Committee ed., 2002).
79. See Bronner v. Mediaprint, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791 [hereinafter
Bronner].
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ular) make clear that access to intellectual property is not indis-
pensable, if a dominant undertaking's competitors can develop
and market their products without access to the intellectual
property, even if it would be more convenient for them to have
it. Work group server operating systems are offered by various
suppliers throughout Europe."1 They can interoperate with
Microsoft operating systems through a variety of means, includ-
ing their own communications protocols. The question is what
is meant by interoperability.
There was fierce debate concerning whether the goal
should be the notion of interoperability as set forth in the
Software Directive 2 (though that definition was itself controver-
sial) so that two heterogeneous products could communicate
with each other, or whether the goal should be that one product
could replace the other. Servers do talk to servers routinely and
reliably using industry standard protocols, without possessing
each other's private communications protocols. Two products
can - argued Microsoft - interoperate without the need for one
to be a "plug replacement" for the other. However, the more
ambitious goal of the Decision was to endow the licensed server
operating system with the capacity of functioning in place of one
Windows server in a network of Windows servers. Thus, the De-
cision focused not on the ability of two operating systems to work
together, but on the ability of a non-Microsoft server operating
system to perform as if it was a perfect replication of a Windows
server operating system in the delivery of certain services (deliv-
ered by a cluster of servers, each running the same operating
system) .83
80. See Tierce Ladbroke v. Commission, Case T-504/93, [1997] E.C.R. 11-923 [here-
inafter Ladbroke].
81. The Microsoft Decision itself identified Apple, IBM, Novell, Sun, and Linux ven-
dors such as RedHat and SuSE, as competitors in the supply of "work group" server
operating systems. See Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 (2004), 93-106.
82. Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer pro-
grams, 91/250/EEC, O.J. L 122/42 (1991).
83. The Microsoft Decision states at Paragraph 669:
As regards the use of open industry standards implemented in Windows, inter-
operability within a Windows work group network largely depends on specifi-
cations that are proprietary or are extended versions of standard protocols.
Therefore, open industry standards fall short of enabling competitors to achieve the
same degree of interoperability with the Windows domain architecture as Windows work
group server operating systems do. Since all major work group server operating
system vendors already support most of the open industry standards supported
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The second condition is the emergence of a new product for
which there is unmet consumer demand.84 The existence of any intel-
lectual property right will commonly involve the existence of a
legal monopoly. The challenge for competition law is to estab-
lish a realistic and predictable framework to determine those
rare circumstances where the holder of the legal monopoly must
share the intellectual property right with others. There is noth-
ing intrinsically wrong in a right holder saying no to a licensee.
That principle goes back to Volvo/Veng85 and is consistent with
the general principles established in Ladbroke 6 and Bronner.87
Dominant players are not under a particular duty to help their
competitors by supplying goods or services to them. The Magill
judgment established parameters which should be present
before a compulsory license must be granted. IMS provided for
more clarity, by insisting that protection of competition should
prevail over intellectual property rights only where a refusal to
license prevents the emergence of a new product on a secondary
market for which there is unmet consumer demand. According
to IMS, essentially "duplicating the goods or services already of-
fered on the secondary market by the owner of the copyright" is
not sufficient.88 A company wishing to receive a license must
"intend to offer new goods or services not offered by the owner
of the right and for which there is potential consumer de-
mand."89
Now in Bronner, the Court did not expressly mention this
condition when setting out the test it considered was applicable
(delivery of papers did not present the problem). IMS, there-
fore, sets a marginally stricter test than Bronner. The Microsoft
Decision expressed concern about the possibility that competi-
tors are discouraged from developing new products because they
in Windows, it can be concluded that this degree of interoperability proves to
be insufficient for them to viably compete in the market. Therefore, reliance
on open industry standards cannot be considered to be at present a realistic
substitute to disclosures by Microsoft.
Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 (2004), 1 669 (emphasis added).
84. IMS, Case 418/01 (not yet reported), 1 38.
85. Volvo/Veng, Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, 8, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 122.
86. [1997] E.C.R. 11-923.
87. [1998] E.C.R. 1-7791.
88. IMS, Case C-418/01, 1 49.
89. Id.
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do not have access to Microsoft's secrets.9" It does not, however,
suggest finding that recipients of Microsoft's technology will pro-
duce new products not currently offered by Microsoft. It merely
refers to "innovative features" in "work group" server operating
systems that Microsoft's competitors might bring to market.9 1
Thus, new products may emerge when the competitive advan-
tage has been eliminated.
On the third condition, elimination of competition, the Court's
test in IMS speaks of "elimination of all competition."9 2 By con-
trast, the test of March 24, 2004, is the "risk of elimination of
competition," a test93 based on probabilities, and more specifi-
cally on the declining share of one competitor, Novell, and the
rationalization of the success of a new entrant, Linux.94 To sup-
port its test, the Commission relies on general cases on refusal to
supply (Commercial Solvents and T6l6marketing), thus presenting
the compulsory licensing case as a refusal to supply.95 However,
in each of those cases the prospect of eliminating competition
was immediate and real, because there were no alternative
sources of supply. In Microsoft, it remains true that competition
in work group servers and the operating systems which control
them has not been eliminated some five-and-a-half years after
the alleged refusal to supply. There are still several competing
systems.96
The Commission seems to admit this and does not claim
"that competition is already eliminated in the market for work
group server operating systems, or that it would be impossible to
achieve even some partial interoperability with Windows client
90. Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, (2004), 694.
91. Id.
92. IMS, Case C-418/01, 52.
93. This seems to contradict the established rule that in Article 82 EC the burden
of proof rests on the Commission. Article 2 of the new Regulation 1/2003 does not
make any distinction in the case of Article 82 EC as it does with Article 81 EC, and
provides that "the burden of proving an infringement of Article 81(1) or of Article 82 of
the Treaty shall rest on the party or the authority alleging the infringement." Council
Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 2, OJ. L 1/1, (2003) (emphasis added).
94. Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, (2004), 585.
95. Id.
96. Indeed, during that time period there has been a successful entrant - Linux -
which went from being too small to be tracked separately to obtaining 6% of the total
server operating system market and 11% of the narrow "work group" server operating
systems. See id.
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PC and work group server operating system." 97
It then states that "some partial interoperability" is possible,
also due to "previous disclosures made by Microsoft."98 How-
ever, according to the Commission, "the degree of interoper-
ability that can be achieved on the basis of Microsoft's disclo-
sures is insufficient to enable competitors to viably stay in the
market."9 9 The goal of the Decision thus appears to be deliver-
ing a "sufficient" degree of supply of interoperability, and thus,
by implication, a "sufficient" degree of competition. This sort of
"planning" also echoes a system of ex ante enforcement (such as
in merger control), rather than of ex post enforcement, as it cur-
rently happens with Articles 81 and 82 of the E.C. Treaty. Like-
wise, as to the other half of the case, the goal of the Decision is
to achieve greater penetration by media players supplied by com-
panies other than Microsoft. The remedy has been defended by
the Commission's services on the basis that if even 5% of new
PCs were equipped with a media player other than Microsoft's
player, this will encourage software developers to write applica-
tions for that player. 10 This appears to confirm that the remedy is
intended to fragment the Windows platform. Whether or not
that is to be regarded as a desirable goal (Microsoft would deny
that it is desirable), the advantage to be gained from the remedy
is that a significant number of new PCs will lack certain inte-
grated functionalities. This seems to be market engineering on
a grand scale.
Article 82 imposes special duties upon dominant compa-
nies. The Microsoft case involves the imposition on the company
of remedies which are not behavioral but structural. The com-
pany is under a permanent duty to change how it behaves, once
by forcing the licensing of its technology, once by redesigning its
product. The former is imposed as the remedy for the response
by the company to a request for wide revelation of technology.
The latter is the penalty for including, without extra charge in
Windows in 1999, video streaming as well as the already available
video downloading and audio streaming.'01 Thus, the addressee
97. Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 (2004), 589 n.712.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Although the "tying" part of the Commission's Decision is not the focus of
this contribution, one cannot help stressing the equally extraordinary nature of the
2005] ARTICLE 82: REMEDIES IN SEARCH OF THEORIES? 949
of the Decision is ordered to reorganize its affairs as the penalty
for two novel infringements.
The fourth condition is objective justification. Must objective
justification always be affirmatively present as a pre-condition for
a company to be able to exploit its intellectual property rights?
This cannot be so, otherwise we would reach the perverse con-
clusion that dominant companies could never safely rely upon
their valuable IP, unless they can objectively justify that reliance.
What the test will mean in practice will require some more argu-
ment and reflection. Any dominant company is objectively justi-
fied in not disclosing its intellectual property to a major competi-
tor to assist it in seeking to displace its products in the market.
So, it seems that the objective justification condition is relevant
to cases in which there is some other affirmative exclusionary
element in the conduct of a dominant undertaking that leads to
the elimination of competition. A bare refusal to license should
not be abusive, as we have known since Volvo/Veng.
Therefore, this is an appropriate occasion to address the ac-
companying abuses of which the Commission accuses Microsoft.
The Commission alleges that Microsoft has disrupted previous
levels of supply and that disclosure of interoperability informa-
tion was Microsoft's initial policy but was later discontinued in
order to hurt competitors. 10 2 Thus, by not disclosing the new
interface specifications that organize the Windows 2000 domain,
while it previously disclosed part of the corresponding interface
specifications for the Windows NT domain, Microsoft was dis-
rupting a prior pattern of making supplies." On this line of
theory, it is Commercial Solvents which is the relevant precedent.
It is not appropriate in an academic paper to go too deeply
remedy imposed under this part. The Commission, there, has taken the view that inte-
grating new functionalities into a dominant product in the technology sphere consti-
tutes tying because it confers incremental distribution advantages and raises a theoreti-
cal possibility of market tipping. As a remedy, the Commission has ordered Microsoft
to put onto the market an additional degraded version of its Windows product lacking
the media functionality. It seems not to be disputed that today all operating systems
offer media functionality, and that there is no demand for an operating system without
media functionality. There is a demand for media players and most consumers install
several. The purpose of ordering Microsoft to offer the special version of its flagship
product is to weaken the ubiquitous availability of an attractive feature, in the hope that
consumers or the computer manufacturers form which they buy will be tempted to
install other media players. This is market engineering on a bold scale.
102. Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 (2004), 1 579-84.
103. Id. 584.
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into facts about which only the parties are able to have an inde-
pendent view. In short, the parties agree that from 1994 to 2000
a broad range of technology was made available by Microsoft to
one licensee, AT&T, which granted a number of sub-licenses on
the basis of which many products in use today were developed;
the parties agreed to end their licensing arrangement in the late
1990s. Microsoft states that a company cannot be obliged to li-
cense every new version of its technology to the world in general
once it has licensed to one party different technology. As to the
controversy with Sun Microsystems, it is agreed that a broad re-
quest was made for a range of information about Microsoft's fu-
ture products, much broader than the communications proto-
cols which are the subject of the remedy imposed by the Deci-
sion. The nexus between the alleged refusal to supply and the
compulsory IP licensing remedy is not evident. The scope of
what Microsoft must deliver by license to its competitors is much
narrower than what it supposedly declined to deliver in 1998.
The Commission rejected these justifications by applying a
new balancing test, which weighs Microsoft's incentives to inno-
vate against the incentives of the whole industry to innovate were
Microsoft required to make its technology available for li-
cense.1"4 This balancing test appears to be extraordinarily im-
precise. It cannot be prudent for the law to suggest that when a
possibly dominant company receives a request for help of a tech-
nological kind from a competitor or anyone else, it is at risk of
abusing Article 82 if its refusal seems likely to damage the public
good, or for a compulsory license to be justified on the ground
that forcing the licensee to share one technology will encourage
it to develop new ones. Pruning shrubs in spring promotes
growth, but it seems doubtful if technology will respond in the
same way as horticultural assets. There is no objective standard
against which a dominant company can decide whether it is
obliged to license or not.
One consequence is that a dominant undertaking is at risk
of reaching a point in the development of its product, incapable
of being identified in advance, when suddenly it will be under a
positive duty to deliver valuable intellectual property to competi-
tors wishing to duplicate its products, and its inclusion of new
functionalities at no extra cost in its standard product will be
104. Id. 669.
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regarded as an illegal tie, rather than as the enhancement of an
integrated product. If it makes the analysis wrongly, it risks a
colossal fine.
V. EPILOGUE
The Microsoft case is and will remain a celebrated conflict. It
remains to be seen whether it represents the drama of an aberra-
tional one-off case or the awakenings of a new doctrine in EC
competition law, which has been called "the doctrine of conve-
nient facilities".1"5 The system of free competition in the mar-
ket, the system that rewards success and punishes failure, be-
comes blurred by an excessive degree of paternalism. The U.S.
Supreme Court in Trinko1 °6 was unequivocal in condemning this
approach and held that "enforced sharing ... requires antitrust
courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price,
quantity and other terms of dealing - a role for which they are
ill-suited." 107
I submit that the Commission Decision in Microsoft consti-
tutes a huge piece of legal innovation. The two abuses defined
there are different from all previous abuses. The two remedies
are not less remarkable. There is a deep transatlantic gap as to
Microsoft, the gap as to pharmaceuticals may seem less profound
because of the difference in social and regulatory context. In
both cases, however, the competition enforcer is pursuing a pol-
icy goal for the sake of specific beneficiaries, rather than classi-
cally discernible notions of pure competition.
105. See Ridyard, supra note 33.
106. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S. 398
(2004).
107. Id. at 408.
